linux_kernel/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
Tianjia Zhang 2155256396 X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification
The digital certificate format based on SM2 crypto algorithm as
specified in GM/T 0015-2012. It was published by State Encryption
Management Bureau, China.

The method of generating Other User Information is defined as
ZA=H256(ENTLA || IDA || a || b || xG || yG || xA || yA), it also
specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.

The x509 certificate supports SM2-with-SM3 type certificate
verification.  Because certificate verification requires ZA
in addition to tbs data, ZA also depends on elliptic curve
parameters and public key data, so you need to access tbs in sig
and calculate ZA. Finally calculate the digest of the
signature and complete the verification work. The calculation
process of ZA is declared in specifications GM/T 0009-2012
and GM/T 0003.2-2012.

Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-09-25 17:48:55 +10:00

274 lines
6.3 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
#include "x509_parser.h"
/*
* Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves
* digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
*/
int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
size_t desc_size;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
sig->data = cert->tbs;
sig->data_size = cert->tbs_size;
if (!cert->pub->pkey_algo)
cert->unsupported_key = true;
if (!sig->pkey_algo)
cert->unsupported_sig = true;
/* We check the hash if we can - even if we can't then verify it */
if (!sig->hash_algo) {
cert->unsupported_sig = true;
return 0;
}
sig->s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig->s)
return -ENOMEM;
sig->s_size = cert->raw_sig_size;
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
cert->unsupported_sig = true;
return 0;
}
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
ret = -ENOMEM;
sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig->digest)
goto error;
desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
goto error;
desc->tfm = tfm;
ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->digest);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_2;
ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size, "tbs");
if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) {
pr_err("Cert %*phN is blacklisted\n",
sig->digest_size, sig->digest);
cert->blacklisted = true;
ret = 0;
}
error_2:
kfree(desc);
error:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
/*
* Check for self-signedness in an X.509 cert and if found, check the signature
* immediately if we can.
*/
int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
int ret = 0;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
if (cert->raw_subject_size != cert->raw_issuer_size ||
memcmp(cert->raw_subject, cert->raw_issuer,
cert->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
goto not_self_signed;
if (cert->sig->auth_ids[0] || cert->sig->auth_ids[1]) {
/* If the AKID is present it may have one or two parts. If
* both are supplied, both must match.
*/
bool a = asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->sig->auth_ids[1]);
bool b = asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->sig->auth_ids[0]);
if (!a && !b)
goto not_self_signed;
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
if (((a && !b) || (b && !a)) &&
cert->sig->auth_ids[0] && cert->sig->auth_ids[1])
goto out;
}
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
if (strcmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, cert->sig->pkey_algo) != 0)
goto out;
ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
cert->unsupported_sig = true;
ret = 0;
}
goto out;
}
pr_devel("Cert Self-signature verified");
cert->self_signed = true;
out:
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
not_self_signed:
pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [not]\n", __func__);
return 0;
}
/*
* Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
*/
static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
struct x509_certificate *cert;
const char *q;
size_t srlen, sulen;
char *desc = NULL, *p;
int ret;
cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
if (IS_ERR(cert))
return PTR_ERR(cert);
pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
if (cert->unsupported_key) {
ret = -ENOPKG;
goto error_free_cert;
}
pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", cert->pub->pkey_algo);
pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to);
cert->pub->id_type = "X509";
if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
cert->sig = NULL;
} else {
pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
cert->sig->pkey_algo, cert->sig->hash_algo);
}
/* Don't permit addition of blacklisted keys */
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
if (cert->blacklisted)
goto error_free_cert;
/* Propose a description */
sulen = strlen(cert->subject);
if (cert->raw_skid) {
srlen = cert->raw_skid_size;
q = cert->raw_skid;
} else {
srlen = cert->raw_serial_size;
q = cert->raw_serial;
}
ret = -ENOMEM;
desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
goto error_free_cert;
p = memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
p += sulen;
*p++ = ':';
*p++ = ' ';
p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
*p = 0;
kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kids)
goto error_free_desc;
kids->id[0] = cert->id;
kids->id[1] = cert->skid;
/* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
__module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype;
prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = kids;
prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = cert->pub;
prep->payload.data[asym_auth] = cert->sig;
prep->description = desc;
prep->quotalen = 100;
/* We've finished with the certificate */
cert->pub = NULL;
cert->id = NULL;
cert->skid = NULL;
cert->sig = NULL;
desc = NULL;
ret = 0;
error_free_desc:
kfree(desc);
error_free_cert:
x509_free_certificate(cert);
return ret;
}
static struct asymmetric_key_parser x509_key_parser = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.name = "x509",
.parse = x509_key_preparse,
};
/*
* Module stuff
*/
static int __init x509_key_init(void)
{
return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&x509_key_parser);
}
static void __exit x509_key_exit(void)
{
unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&x509_key_parser);
}
module_init(x509_key_init);
module_exit(x509_key_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("X.509 certificate parser");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");